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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the invariance of 
magnitude and category scales. The starting point of the paper is 
that neither of the two methods is theoretically more correct, and 
that they represent two different ways of numerically judging stim-
uli. Two samples (Americans and Indians) judged and rejudged the 
seriousness of criminal offenses by both category and magnitude 
estimation procedureso The results indicated that neither of the 
methods was consistently invariant. More specifically, it seems 
that some populations may be better able to make the discrimina-
tions implied in one judgmental procedure, while another population 
may be better able to use another judgmental procedure. The re-
sults also indicated that, from a methodological point of view, a 
restricted judgmental continuum is preferable to an open-ended one 
such as is used in some magnitude scales. 
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THE INVARIANCE OF CATEGORY AND MAGNITUDE 
SCAL~S1 A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY 
Michael B. Donnelly 
Loyola University, Chicago 
Classical scaling (as opposed to more recent developments such 
the theory of signal detection) can be organized roughly as fol-
lOWSI 
Psychophysical 
(metric) 
Psychological 
(non-:netric) 
Indirect 
(Category scale) 
Fechner 
Thurs tone 
'I'hurstone 
Direct 
(Magnitude scale) 
Stevens 
Stevens 
Included in the psychophysical methods where Fechner's law 
holds are the method of average error, method of limits, and the 
cor:stant methods. As noted in the table, these methods can be used 
only when the stimuli can be represented on a physical continuum. 
The methods used in magnitude scales are ratio estimation, ratio 
production, magnitude estimation, and magnitude production. Most 
of these methods can be used with either metric or non-metric stim-
uli. Thurstone scaling refers to his ttLaw of Comparative Judg-
ments." These methods can be used with either psychophysical or 
psychological data, though they are typically applied to psycho-
logical stimuli. In this study the main concern will be with non-
metric stimuli. 
several terms are used to denote the direct and indirect 
methods. The direct methods are often referred to as magnitude 
scales or ratio scales; while the indirect methods (at least the 
ones of interest in this paper) are referred to as category scales, 
confusion scales, or interval scales. Also, the unscaled values 
used in categorical judgments are referred to as a category rating 
scale, a partition scale, or category means. All these terms will 
be used interchangeably in the text. 
The Fechner-Thurstone and Stevens methods can be differenti-
ated in several ways. First of all, in the Fechner-Thurstone 
methods, the scale values are arrived at indirectly (i.e., either 
qualitative judgments or category judgments are transformed onto a 
continuous scale); whereas direct numerical estimates are obtained 
in the Stevens approach. Second, and perhaps more important, dif-
ferent types of judgments are made in the direct and indirect meth-
ods. In the direct methods, ratio-type judgments are always made, 
with the hope of obtaining a ratio scale. In the indirect methods, 
the judgments are made in such a way as to obtain an interval 
scale. It is interesting to note that "the power law is always 
verified by the direct ratio methods, and only by these methods" 
(Ekman, 1964a, p. 1). It would be interesting to make interval 
judgments with the direct estimation methods and see if the power 
law still holds. Probably this would not be the case. Actually, 
category means (unscaled category judgments) are really direct es-
timates which have been forced on a relatively confined continuum. 
This points to a third difference in these two methodologies. Typ-
2 
icallY in the direct methods (with few exceptions, e.g., the con-
stant sum method), the subjects are not constrained as to the size 
of the numerical estimates they can make; whereas in the indirect 
methods, more definite limitations are placed on their numerical 
judgments. 
Historically, the indirect methods have preceded the direct 
methods; though Hurvich (1969) has pointed out that both Plateau 
and Herring, contemporaries of Fechner, proposed essentially mag-
nitude type judgments and the related power law, Nevertheless, 
until recently (Stevens, 1957a), little systematic work was done 
with the direct methods. 
Also, systematic work on psychophysical scaling historically 
preceded psychological scaling. Thurstone, in a series of articles 
(1927a,b,c,d,e), proposed his Law of Comparative Judgments, which 
provided a model for psychological as well as psychophysical stim-
uli. It is a continuation of Fechnerian scaling in the sense that 
the scale values are arrived at indirectly, and the judgments made 
aim at detemining an interval scale. Stevens (1966) demonstrated 
the utility of the direct ratio estimation method for non-metric 
stimuli. 
Associated with these scaling procedures are three laws: Fech-
ner's law, the power law, and the law of comparative judgments. It 
should be noted in what sense each of these is a law, First of all, 
Fechner's law (S = k log R) is derived from Weber's law. The power 
law (S = kRn) is simply an empirical equation describing the rela-
tion between physical magnitude and subjective estimation. The law 
3 
of comparative judgments (Si - Sj = ..Jo. 2 + o. 2 - 2r .. o.a.) is not 1 J lJ 1 J 
a law at all. It simply presents a model for establishing the dis-
ta nee between stimuli on a psychological continuum. The mode 1 as-
sumes that the stimuli are normally distributed on the psychologi-
cal continuum and that the distance between stimuli is computed by 
a variation of the familiar z score formula. As Thurstone pointed 
out, "It is independent of the validity of Fechner's law. It is 
also independent of the validity of Weber's law" (1927e, p. ht9). 
Also, "the unit of mental measurement that I have proposed is not 
in any sense a j.n.d. The just noticeable difference is in every 
case a stimulus measurement" (1927e, p. 419). Thus, though Stev-
ens criticizes "Fechner-Thurstone" scaling, it is essential that 
Fechner and Thur~tone be considered separately. 
Though the major purpose of this paper is to compare the Thur-
stone and Stevens scaling methods, it will be useful to briefly 
summarize Fechnerian scaling and the criticisms which have been 
made of it. Probably no controversy has been so long lasting as 
that which has surrounded Fechner's law. Boring (1957) presents 
the logic behind the development of Fechner's law. For Fechner, 
the j.n.d. is the unit of sensation. The magnitude of the sensa-
tion is the sum of the j.n.d.'s below it. He assumed that all 
j.n.d.'s are psychologically equal and that the do/ (the differ-
ential of mental intensity y) is continuous. Mathematically, 
Fechner's law is simply the integration of Weber's law. 
Some support the validity of Fechner's law. For example, 
Woodward and Schlosberg (1958) state that "the sum.mated j.n.d. 
4 
ale has a fair claim to being an equal-step type of measurement. sc 
The steps are equally perceptible" (p. 237). In another context, 
Ekman (1964a,b) poses the possibility that the power law may be a 
special case of Fechner•s law. He starts out by assuming that 
Fechner's law adequately describes the relation between any stimu-
lus variable, including the variable of number, and some corres-
ponding subjective variable. Then he argues that the subject might 
be matching the subjective variable to the variable of number in 
the case of direct estimation methods. If this is the case, it can 
be demonstrated that the subjective variable being judged will be a 
power function of the variable of number. He concludes, "The power 
law may be regarded either as describing the relation between a 
subjective variable and a stimulus variable, in which case it is 
the •true' psychophysical law, or as describing the relation be-
tween two stimulus variables, in which case it represents Fechner's 
law expressed in terms of stimulation. I do not think that the 
choice between these alternative interpretations can be based en-
tirely on present knowledge" (Ekman, 1964b, p. 730). From still 
another point of view, Lewis (1960) statess "In retrospect, it 
seems unfortunate that Fechner utilized the calculus with the con-
sequent acceptance of d¥, the differential of mental intensity V• 
as if it were something having behavioral significance. He might 
have used the process of integration solely for computational pur-
poses •• ,; ·but he chose to go the whole way (to the limit). He 
needn't have done this; he could have started with Weber's law and 
come out with an equation essentially the same--if he had been con-
5 
• i"th the number of j.n.d. steps as the measure of mental (or 
ten(, w 
hological) intensity y. The numbers might have been the same; psyc 
the difference would have been in the implications of the numbers 
and, perhaps, in the amount of ire and senseless controversy pro-
voked" (P. hJ2). 
Actually, the real problem of Fechnerian scaling is not Fech-
ner's law. It is Weber's law, from which Fechner derived his law. 
For, as Luce and Edwards (1958) have pointed out, Fechnerian inte-
gration is permissible only in the special case in which Weber's 
law holds. Implied in this statement is the assumption that the 
j~n.d.'s are equal units not only on the physical scale but also on 
the psychological continuum. Obviously, the major problem is to 
establish the psychological equality of the j.n.d.'s. Stevens 
(1957) has argued that the j.n.d.'s (or, more generally, equally 
often noticed differences) are not subjectively equal on prothetic 
continua but may be on metathetic continua. He demonstrates this 
by assuming that both the power law and Weber's law are true. Not 
too surprisingly (given these two conflicting assumptions), he dem-
onstrates that on prothetic continua the j.n.d. size increases as 
the sensation increases. Stated in terms of Thurstone~ model, the 
discriminal dispersion is not constant but is proportional to the 
psychological magnitude in question. 
Thurstone (1927c,d,e) and Guilford (1954) have stated the con-
ditions for psychological equality of units. They have demonstrated 
that equally often noticed differences and equal psychological dif-
ferences are identical only when the discriminal dispersions of the 
stimuli are equal. It is important to note that this demonstration 
6 
r- not involve any assumption concerning the nature of the psy-ctoe~ 
chophysical relation (in contrast to Stevens' argu~ent). More spe-
cifically, Weber's law (and consequently Fechner's law) will hold 
onlY if the discriminal dispersions are.equal throughout the range 
of stimuli• 
The major point of the review up to this point has been to es-
tablish the fact that though Fechner and Thurstone scaling are sim-
ilar in some respects, they are essentially different. In the next 
section of this paper, Stevens' criticisms of Thurstone scaling and 
related category methods will be discussed. 
In order to understand Stevens' major criticism of Thurstonian 
scaling, it is necessary to know the general relation between cate-
gory and magnitude scales. Studies of this sort can be divided in-
to those concerned with psychophysical stimuli and those concerned 
with psychological stimuli. 
First of all, several psychophysical studies will be reviewed. 
One of the first systematic studies investigating the relation be-
tween category and magnitude scales was a rather extensive inve sti-
gation of a dozen perceptual continua (Stevens and Galanter, 1957). 
Three types of scales were derived for each of the continua: a mag-
nitude scale, a j.n.d. scale, and a category rating scale. For 
eight of the continua (apparent length, numerousness, duration, 
area, heaviness, loudness, brightness and lightness), a near log 
relation was found between the j.n.d. and magnitude scales, and a 
concave downward (not log) relation was found between magnitude and 
category rating scales. For the continua of visual position, in-
clination, proportion and pitch, a near linear relation was found 
7 
between the magnitude, ~he j.n.d., and the category rating scales. 
These results were the basis for Stevens' distinction between 
prothetic and metathetic continua. Stevens (1957) hypothesizes 
that prothetic continua deal with quantity and are mediated physio-
logically by some additive process. He argues that for prothetic 
continua, subjects vary in sensitivity to stimulus differences when 
making category judgments. Metathetic continua deal with qualita-
tive differences between stimuli. The underlying physiological 
process mediating metathetic stimuli is substitutive, He argues 
that on metathetic continua, subjects' sensitivity to stimulus dif-
ferences remain relatively constant. 
A rather curious use has been made. of the distinction between 
me~athetic and prothetic continua. Originally, the concepts were 
developed in the ccntext of psychophysical stimuli. However, they 
have been applied to psychological stimuli; and as Dudek points 
outs "Why the intensity of adverbs should behave like Class I con-
tinua [prothetic], however, is not particularly obvious" (Dudek, 
1959, p. 446). That is, the distinction between metathetic and 
prothetic continua makes little sense when applied to non-metric 
stimuli. 
Several other psychophysical studies have found a concave 
downward relation between magnitude and category scales. In the 
studies reported here, the category method used was typically a 
category rating scale, where the scale value for a particular stim-
ulus was found by averaging the ratings across subjects. Ekman and 
K~nnapas (1960) found the concave downward relation between magni-
8 
tude and category scales for six different wave lengths of mono-
chromatic light. Ekman et al. (1964) found this relation between 
magnitude and category scales when subjects rated the unpleasant-
ness of electrical stimulation. Finally, Ekman and Hasman (1965) 
found a log relation between magnitude and category scales when es-
timating the size of numbers. 
This relation has been extensively investigated for psycholo-
gical stimuli. The concave downward relation (often logarithmic) 
was found in the following studies& occupational preferences (Kiln-
napas and WikstrBm, 1963); political preferences (Kilnnapas and Sil-
ler, 1965): musical preferences in normals and mentally retarded 
(Koh, 1965; Koh and Koh, 1966); value judgments (Donnelly and Rim-
oldi, 1967); political conservatism (Ekman and Kilnnapas, 1963); 
aesthetic values of children's drawings (Ekman and K-rlnnapas, 1962); 
moral judgments (Ekman, 1962); aesthetic value of handwriting spec-
imens (Ekman and Kilnnapas, 1962); favorableness of adverbs (Dudek, 
1959); pleasantness of odors (Engen and McBurney, 1964); serious-
ness of criminal offenses (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964); and politi-
cal importance of Swedish monarchs (Ekman and Kunnapas, 1963). It 
should be noted that in all of these studies, either simple cate-
gory means or Case V solutions were used in estimating the category 
scale values. The importance of this will be discussed later in 
the review. 
All these results can be summarized as followss "The general 
form, usually approximately logarithmic, of the relation between 
category and ratio scales may now be considered as a well-estab-
9 
lished fact. The theoretical interpretation of the relation may, 
however, still be considered a matter of controversy and uncertain-
ty. In particular, it should, perhaps, not yet be taken for grant-
ed that the whole problem is to account for a bias in category 
scales, using ratio scales as criteria" (Ekman and SjBberg, :i965, 
P• 464). 
Given this general result and several other related findings, 
Stevens (1960, 1966) has formulated a thorough criticism of the 
Thurstone scaling model. It should be noted that these criticisms 
have been applied to psychological stimuli. His criticisms may be 
summarized as followsi 1) He argues that the magnitude scales rep-
resent a higher order scale. 2) Magnitude scales are the result of 
direct methods, whereas the scale values of Thurstone's procedure 
are arrived at indirectly. He makes a distinction between parti-
tion measures, which are arrived at directly, and the Thurstone 
confusion measures. J) The use of Thurstone•s Case V is not valid, 
since it assumes constant discriminal dispersions. 4) The reason 
for the concave downward relation is due to the differential sensi-
tivity of subjects to stimulus differences for category scales. 
Each of these criticisms will now be considered in more detail. 
First of all, he argues that magnitude scales represent a 
higher order scale than category scales. If we grant that magni-
tude scales are in fact true ratio scales, then, for some purposes, 
this is a distinct advantage. For example, it certainly gives more 
information about the relation between stimuli to know that one 
stimulus is twice the magnitude of another than to know that five 
10 
scale points separate the two stimuli. On the other hand, they are 
not ratio scales in an absolute sense. Typically, the ratios are 
formulated in terms of one stimulus or a set of stimuli, and the 
"true" origin (zero point) is not obtained. Also, it seems that 
the type of discriminations made in magnitude scales is quite soph-
isticated. A given sample of subjects may not be able to make the 
discriminations implied in this procedure. Category scales, par-
ticularly in the case of Thurstone's pair comparison procedure, im-
ply only the simplest of discriminations. All things being equal, 
however, a ratio scale is preferable to an interval scale. 
A second distinction between category and magnitude scales is 
that typically the magnitude scales are arrived at directly, where-
as the category scales are arrived at indirectly. More concretely, 
the magnitude scale value of a stimulus (using one method) is simp-
ly the geometric mean of the ratio judgments across subjects. In 
the case of category scales, various transformations are made to 
arrive at scale values. Stevens criticizes the indirect approach 
from two points of view. First of all, he (Stevens, 1960) seems to 
be opposed to model making. He prefers to use the direct estimates. 
This obviously is a metatheoretical issue and is largely a matter 
of preference. However, it seems intuitively reasonable to the 
author that a mathematical model for measurement which can be test-
ed is preferable to measurement by fiat. Secondly, he argues that 
the Thurstone scales are confusion scales. "If not explicitly, at 
least by implication, this philosophy of indirect measurement as-
serts that all we can know about magnitude is what confusion tells 
11 
US• variability becomes the measure of things, and the mean is 
meaningless" (Stevens, 1957, P• 154). While this criticism sounds 
quite reasonable, closer examination reveals the ingenuity of Thur-
stone's approach. The Thurstone model attempts to place stimuli 
along an unobservable psychological continuum. However, if we can 
estimate the dispersion of each stimulus along the psychological 
continuum, state some assumptions concerning the nature of the cor-
relations between stimuli, and assume that the stimuli are normally 
distributed, then we can define the distance between stimuli. That 
is, the distance between two stimuli (Si - S j) is simply the normal 
deviate (x .. ) times the standard deviation of the differences 
1J 
(.jo 2
1
• + u 2 J. - 2r . . o.o.). Obviously, this is just a variation on 
1J 1 J 
classical mental test theory. As a mathematical model, there is 
nothing wrong with this procedure. Thus, if one disagrees with 
this approach, the disagreement stems from a matter of taste. 
Stevens (1957, 1960, 1966), when discussing category scales, 
divides them into two categoriess partition scales and confusion 
scales. The partition scale is simply a category rating scale. 
The confusion scale (in the case of the law of categorical judg-
ments) is simply the application of the Thurstone model to the cat-
egory ratings. Stevens presents evidence that the confusion scale 
is a logarithmic function of the magnitude scale, and the partition 
scale has a less concave relation to the magnitude scale. However, 
Donnelly and Rimoldi (1967) have found a near perfect relation be-
tween these two scales, which would at least cast some doubt on the 
generality of this result. 
12 
Jones (1960) accepts Stevens' criticism of the partition 
scales. He argues that when subjects use the partition scales, 
they are not able to separate stimulus differences at the extremes 
of the scale; however, he presents evidence that this is not true 
for confusion scales. 
Stevens and others (Stevens, 1960; Ekman and KUnnapas, 1963), 
when criticizing the Thurstone procedure, typically criticize the 
case v solution. They argue that this procedure is wrong, since 
the discriminal dispersion is proportional to (a positive linear 
function of) the magnitude of the stimulus (Ekman's law). However, 
this proportionality has been established by means of the relation 
between magnitude scale values and the standard deviation of the 
judgments. There is no reason to suppose that this relation would 
hold for category scales. Furthermore, there is no reason to use 
only Case V solutions. Methods are available for estimating the 
discriminal dispersions (e.g., Rimoldi and Hormaeche, 1955; Bock 
and Jones, 1968). Thus, there is no reason not to use the Case III 
solution. The particular relation between stimulus value and stim-
ulus dispersion becomes unimportant except for theoretical interest. 
Perhaps the most substantive and critical issue in this contro-
versy is concerned with the concave downward relation between mag-
nitude and category scales. Stevens argues that this relation in-
dicates that the Thurstone scale is not a true equal interval 
scale. "The chief factor that produces nonlinearity in the cate-
gory scales of Class I is variation in the subjects' sensitivity to 
differences. Near the lower end of the scale, where discrimination 
13 
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is good, the categories tend to be narrow, and consequently the 
slope of the function is steep. Near the upper end, where a given 
stimulus difference is less easy to detect, the categories broaden 
and the slope declines" (Stevens, 1957, P• 155). Ekman and Kunna-
pas (1963) further support this argument by saying that if the dis-
criminal dispersion is proportional to the scale value and not con-
stant, as is assumed in Case V, then the logarithmic relation be-
tween magnitude and category scales is to be expected. Note, how-
ever, that "Ekman' s Law" holds only for category judgments where 
the Case V model is used. 
Torgerson (1960) presents evidence against Stevens' interpre-
tation of the concave downward relation and propose a different ex-
planation. First, he performed an experiment in which subjects 
judged both the brightness and darkness of 17 Munsell neutral gray 
papers, using category and magnitude judgments. For both lightness 
and darkness, the category scale is approximately the log of the 
magnitude scale. He then compared the darkness scale with the 
lightness scale for both category and magnitude scales. "The two 
methods behave as expected. For the category methods, lightness is 
the reverse of darkness; whereas for the magnitude methods light-
ness is the reciprocal of darkness. Thus, when measured on cate-
gory scales, stimuli which are equally spaced with respect to 
lightness are also equally spaced with respect to darkness. In the 
category scales, the distance relationships are invariant. Stimuli 
separated by equal ratios of lightness, on the other hand, are not 
separated by equal ratios of darkness" (Torgerson, 1960, p. 29). 
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He then concludes1 "It seems to me that the results throw some 
doubt on the notion that the non-linearity of the two classes of 
methods is caused by the subject's confusion of discriminality 
with distance. It sort of goes against the grain to say that the 
discriminality of a particular pair of stimuli is very good with 
respect to lightness, and very poor with respect to darkness, even 
though the discriminality stays the same with respect to the number 
of times the two stimuli are confused." (p. 31). If the concave 
downward relation is not due to the varying sensitivity of subjects 
when making category judgments, another explanation should be found 
for the relation. Torgerson argues that this relation may be un-
derstood in terms of the type of judgments the subject is making. 
"Actually, I do not think either of the two methods [category or 
magnitude] is in error. Instead, I suspect they reflect more or 
less directly the two standard ways we have of regarding ••• and us-
ing ••• numbers or quantity •••• If we assign numbers so that a 
change from 10 to 11 pounds is the same size as a change from 1000 
to 1001 pounds, we get one type of scale. We get a second type of 
scale by assigning numbers so that the change from 10 to 11 is more 
nearly equal to--say--a change from 1000 to 1100. One scale turns 
out to be roughly the log of the other--and this sounds familiar" 
(pp. 24-25). 
Donnelly and Rimoldi (1967) attempted to test this hypothesis. 
They constructed four scales1 two partition scales, a confusion 
scale (Law of Categorical Judgments, Case III), and a magnitude 
scale (constant sum method). Two scales were derived from the con-
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stant sum judgments. One was simply the average value given to 
eacl1 stimulus (a par ti ti on scale). The other took the geometric 
mean of the ratios of each stimulus with all the other stimuli. 
The relation between these two scales was perfectly logarithmic. 
These two scales were obtained from the same data and thus from the 
srune psychological process, the only difference being in the trans-
formations made on the data. The constant sum average ratio scale 
was also logarithmically related to the other partition scale and 
the confusion scale. The partition scale derived from the constant 
sum judgments was approximately linearly related to the other par• 
tition scale and the confusion scale. This data strongly suggests 
that Torgerson's explanation of the concave downward relation be-
tween the two scales is accurate. That is, there are two types of 
judgmental procedures, and they are logarithmically related. Thus 
it would seem that there is little theoretical reason to choose be-
tween the two methods. This paper will examine whether there are 
empirical reasons for choosing one or the other of these two meth-
ods. More specifically, an examination will be made of the invari-
ance of these two procedures. 
Candland states that ttTextbooks say remarkably little about 
these characteristics [validity and reliability] of scaling meth-
ods. While experimental psychologists express concern over the re-
liability and validity of mental or projective tests, they seem un-
interested in similar measures of psychophysics and scaling" (1968, 
p. 143). The present study is concerned with the reliability (in a 
broad sense) of magnitude and category scales. However, the term 
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invariance is used in preference to reliability, since it implies 
more than just a test-retest correlation. It also implies a unit 
slope and zero intercept. The concept of invariance obviously is 
closely related to that of parallel tests in mental test theory. 
Few studies have been directly concerned with this issue. 
perhaps the most extensive study of this sort was done by Jones 
(1960) for category scales. In this study, 20 food items were pre-
sented on two category rating forms, a 9- and a 6-point scale. 
Each form was given to a different sample of approximately 900 army 
enlisted men, who were instructed to rate their preference for each 
of the 20 food items. Scale values and discriminal dispersions 
were obtained. The relation between the two forms of the test was 
linear, and a unit slope and zero intercept fit the data quite well 
for both scale values and discriminal dispersions. On the other 
hand, he indicates that this is not true for those values obtained 
by simply averaging the ratings. Of course, this is not too sur-
prising, since the units in the two rating forms were not the same. 
Also, it should be pointed out that the slopes and intercepts were 
not tested statistically for their fit to the invariance model. 
While this is the only study the author could find that is directly 
concerned with the invariance of category scales, there is a wealth 
of data which indicates that subjects can accurately make the dis-
criminations implied in category scales. Only a few studies of this 
sort will be cited, Koh and Koh (1966) found correlations between 
.88 and .92 when comparing the scaling of musical preferences in 
normals and mentally retarded. Edwards (1957) reports split-half 
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reliabilities of .87 and .88 for attitude scales developed from 
pair comparison (Case V) procedures. A large body of literature is 
concerned with the prediction of scale values for combined stimuli. 
For example, Rimoldi (1956) demonstrated that there was a linear 
relationship between the scale values of a series of political fig-
ures and the scale values of different pair combinations of the 
same political figures. Along these same lines, Devane and Rimoldi 
(1961) found a linear correlation of .97 between pairs of stimuli 
in combination and the summation of the two stimuli rated separate-
ly. For a more complete description, both mathematical and empiri-
cal, en the prediction of choice, the reader is referred to Bock 
and jones (1968, pp. 248-293). 
Several psychophysical studies have more or less indicated the 
invariance of magnitude scales. Ekman and K~nnapas (1960, 1962) 
found that both scotopic and photopic brightness of monochromatic 
light is a power function of intensity of stimulation, and that the 
exponent in the power function is invariant across wave-lengths as 
well as under different scaling methods. Koh and Koh (1966) found 
correlations between .84 and .94 when comparing scale values ob-
tained from normals and mentally retarded. Sellin and Wolfgang 
(1964) report a correlation of .986 between two groups of students 
when rating the seriousness of twenty criminal offenses. 
In summary, it is the position of this paper that neither the 
category nor the magnitude method of scaling is to be preferred 
theoretically. If one method is preferable to the other, it can 
probably best be demonstrated empirically. While there has been 
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5~e evidence indicating that subjects can make the discriminations 
·mvlied in these procedures, there has not been any systematic com-
1 -
parison of the invariance of magnitude and category scales, This 
is the purpose of the present paper. Two groups (Indians and Am-
ericans) will judge the seriousness of criminal offenses, using 
both category and magnitude estimates, P. comparison will then be 
made of the invariance of these two procedures. 
Method 
Sub~ect~o 50 American college students and 50 Indian college stu-
dents were used in the study. 
Stimuli. JO stimuli were chosen from a monograph by Sellin and 
Wolfgang (1964) concerned in part with the scaling of the serious-
ness of crimes. Several of these stimuli were changed in order to 
make them more applicable to the Indian culture. The stimuli were 
chosen from among the 141 used by Sellin and Wolfgang, such that 
they were evenly distributed along a continuum from least serious 
to most serious. The stimuli are listed in Appendix I. 
Method. Each crime was listed on a Jx5 index card with an identi-
fying number. Subjects were given a pack of thirty cards and told 
to read them, shuffle them, and then to read the instructions in a 
booklet given to them. The booklet explained the procedures for 
category and magnitude scaling. Half of the subjects did the cate-
gory scaling first, while the other half did the magnitude scaling 
first. 
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"Each of the cards in this deck 
refers to a violation of the law; each violation is different. 
your task is to show how serious you think each violation is, not 
what the law says or how the courts or judges might act. 
"For each violation you will be asked to check a number from 1 
to 11 depending on how serious you consider the violation to be. 
If the violation is not very serious, you will check a low number; 
if it is very serious, you will check a high number, For instance, 
1 is the least serious and 11 is the most serious. In this scale 
of seriousness of violations, 6 is more serious than 5 or 4 or any 
number lower than 6. Also 9 is more serious than 8 but less seri-
ous than 10 or 11. Use the number 1 only if you consider the vio-
lation to be very mild and the number 11 only if it is very seri-
ous." 
(An example was then given.) 
"Note that on each of the cards on which statements appear, 
there is a number which identifies the card. This number corres-
ponds to a number in the left-hand column of one of the pages of 
the answer sheet with which you have been provided. Please be cer-
tain that the number of the card which contains the statement for a 
particular judgment corresponds with the proper number on the an-
swer sheet. 
"Now take the cards as they occur in the deck one by one and 
check the category in which you feel the statement should be 
Placed. If the first card in the deck happens to be card number 9, 
go to the corresponding number 9 on the answer sheet and check the 
number (1,2,3, ••• 11) you think best fits this violation. When you 
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f inished placing all the statements in the categories, reshuf-a.re 
fle the cards• 
"Do not spend too much time on any one violation but be sure 
to check them all. Do not turn back to what you have already done. 
Remember this is not a test. The important thing is how you feel 
"" . 1 t' It alJOUt eaCH V10 a 10n. 
1!1structions for !!1.§..gni tude scaling. "Each of the cards in this 
deck refers to a violation of the law; each violation is different. 
Your task is to show how serious you think each violation is, not 
what the law says or how the courts or judges might act. 
"For each violation, you will be asked to assign a score. You 
arrive at this score by comparing the particular violation on the 
card to the standard violation which has already been given a cer-
tain score. The score you give will reflect how serious each vio-
lation seems to you in relation to the standard violation. The 
following is the violation which has been selected as a standard 
and has been assigned a score of 101 
'The offender steals $100 from a bank.' 
11 Now using this violation as a standard, every other violation 
on each card should be scored. For example, if any viola ti on seems 
10 times as serious as the standard violation, assign a score of 
100. If the violation seems half as serious·as the standard assign 
a score of 5. If a violation seems 4 times as serious as the stan-
dard, assign a score of 40. You may use any whole or fractional 
number that is greater than zero, no matter how large or small it 
is, as long as it represents how serious the violation is compared 
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to the standard violation." 
(The remainder of the instructions are identical to those for 
the category scales.) 
Approximately two weeks later, exactly the same procedure was 
repeated • 
.§.falin_g of the data. The category judgments were scaled in two 
ways. First, the mean category rating and standard deviations were 
calculated for each stimulus. These values represent what Stevens 
has called partition scales. However, in this paper they will be 
referred to as category means and category standard deviations. 
Four category mean scales were derived: American - test; American -
retest; Indian - test; and Indian - retest. The category judgments 
were also scaled using the Law of Categorical Judgments (Case I II) 
as described by Rimoldi and Hormaeche (1955). The values obtained 
from this analysis will be referred to as the category scale values 
and discriminal dispersions. The same four sets of scale values 
~ were derived as in the case of the category means. 
~t 
The geometric mean and standard deviation were obtained for 
the magnitude judgments for each stimulus. These values will be re-
ferred to as magnitude scale values. Again, test and retest scales 
were calculated for both the Indians and Americans. 
The above data is summarized with symbolic representation in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Notation 
~===============:=========::;::=================::============ 
Central 
scale Type Group 
category Mean American 
Indian 
category Scale Value American 
Indian 
Magnitude Scale Value American 
(x, y = 1,2, ••• 30) 
(i, j = 1,2,. •• 30) 
(a, b= 1,2, ••• 30) 
Indian 
Results 
Test 
M 
x1 
M 
Y1 
s. 
.11 
s. 
Ji 
M 
ai 
Mb1 
Tendency Dispersion 
Retest Test Retest 
M 
X2 O' x 1 O'x 2 
M O'Yl O'Y2 Y2 
s. 
.12 (j. 11 (J. 12 
s. Cf • CJ • 
J2 J1 J2 
M aa1 u a a2 2 
Mbz O" bi O" b2 
Scalingresults. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the category means, 
category scale values, and magnitude scale values, with their ap-
propriate standard deviations, for the Americans and Indians. This 
data represents the "raw data" for most of the comparisons made in 
this paper. 
Preliminari analyses. One of the first questions to be asked is 
what is the correlation between the category means and the category 
scale values. That is, what is gained by using Thurstone's model 
instead of the "direct" category estimates? Table 5 presents the 
intercorrelations between all the category scales for both Ameri-
cans and Indians. 
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Table 2 
Category Means and Standard Deviations 
-- ----
Americans Indians 
Test Retest Test ~test 
stimulus Mx1 C1 MX2 ox2 1V! C1 M 0 Y2 x1 Y1 Y1 Y2 
1 9.80 1.65 10 .16 1.12 9.36 1 • 81 9. 14 2.05 
2 8.52 2.15 8.50 2.16 9.22 2.02 9.00 2.11 
3 7 .18 2.81 7.34 2.75 7.68 2.68 7.48 2.38 
4 3.74 1.73 3.24 l.46 3.86 2. ~ 0 3.56 1. 98 
5 2.88 1.75 2.92 1.58 5.46 2.41 5.44 2.52 
6 2.88 1.99 2.72 1.65 4.40 2. 01 4.78 2.44 
7 8.40 1.66 8.86 1.50 7.64 2.30 7.70 2.41 
8 3.84 1.79 3.32 1.50 4.16 2.05 3.98 1.96 
9 3.74 2.74 4.26 3 .14 5.50 3.21 6.04 2.97 
10 4.22 1.93 3.82 1.68 I+ .16 2.35 3.64 1.77 
11 5.76 2.30 5. 70 2.36 4.86 2.42 4.80 2.52 
12 4.48 2.32 4.20 2. 36 4.44 2.25 4.02 2.27 
13 2.84 1 .4 3 2.58 1.43 4,22 2.56 3.84 2.54 
14 7.94 2.26 s.oo 2.16 9.32 1.83 9.04 2 .14 
15 2.50 1.58 1 • 8 3 1.09 3. 60 2.35 3.42 2.17 
16 4.68 2.56 4.56 2.60 3.60 2.02 3.50 2.22 
17 5.86 1.74 5.68 1.54 5.80 2.62 5.30 2.62 
18 8.82 2.08 9.14 1.50 7.52 2.05 7.98 2.00 
19 4.96 1.78 4.40 1. 81 3.96 1 • 80 3.90 2.09 
20 7 .18 2. 23 6.98 2.62 7.66 2.41 7.60 2.39 
21 7 .14 2.46 7.34 2.51 8.14 2.36 7.84 2 .17 
22 2.18 1.42 2 .10 1.35 2.48 1.90 2.36 1.47 
23 5.78 2.61 5.64 2.71 7.14 2.88 7.24 2.51 
24 6.22 2.39 6.98 2.33 6.54 2.38 6.92 2.72 
25 4.82 1.86 4.48 1.59 3.98 1.93 3.64 1.76 
26 5.72 2.93 5.76 2.87 6.72 2.77 6.44 2.83 
27 5.74 2.36 5.22 1.95 6.08 2.70 5.84 2.51 
28 6.70 1.93 6.24 2 .19 5.58 2.80 5.06 2.61 
29 6.54 2.48 6.40 2.33 7.66 2.42 7.50 2.32 
JO 3.02 1.84 2.82 1.65 4.09 2.64 3.90 2.32 
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Table J 
Category Scale Values and Discriminal Dispersions 
-
Am~ricans Indians 
Test Retest Test Retest 
stimulus s. a . s. CJ • s. a . s. (J • l.1 l.1 l.2 l.2 Jl Ji J2 J2 
1 2.26 1.24 2.J9 .70 1.37 .73 1.50 1.08 
2 1.36 1.12 1 • l.t8 1.20 1.48 1.08 1.41 1 •OJ 
J .78 1.26 .99 1.34 .75 1.13 • 73 • 91 
4 -.69 .78 -.90 .63 -.73 .94 -.86 1.00 
5 -1.16 .97 -1.07 .78 - .13 .93 .05 .40 
6 -1.29 1.20 -1.28 .92 -.so .93 -.32 1.10 
7 1.20 .75 1.57 .84 ,57 .84 .71 1.00 
8 -.62 .78 -.85 .65 -.58 .99 -.65 .92 
9 -.96 1.55 -.74 1.85 - .13 1.41 - .14 1.27 
10 -.52 .88 -.70 ,77 -.65 1. 05 -.77 .90 
11 .15 .92 .16 1.14 -.32 1.00 -.34 1.03 
12 -.36 1.04 - , l.t6 1 .18 -.44 .93 -.65 1. 06 
13 -1.16 .86 -1.25 .75 -.62 1.12 -.81 1.23 
14 1.06 1.03 1.22 1.11 1.34 .66 1.44 1.02 
15 -1.42 .96 -1.75 .69 -.96 1.18 -1.04 1.17 
16 -.34 1.12 - .l~ 3 1.24 -.88 1. 02 -.92 1.17 
17 .18 .71 .09 .68 - • 01 .97 - .10 1. 07 
18 1.52 1.06 1.74 .85 .67 .60 • 70 • 73 
19 -.14 .68 -.42 .76 -.64 .76 -.?O .99 
20 .70 .88 .75 1.21 .73 .93 .77 .86 
21 .67 1.11 .89 1.19 .94 .95 .85 • 73 
22 -1.67 1.04 -1.69 .93 -1.74 1.32 -1.64 1. 07 
23 .19 1.05 .08 1.35 .56 1.23 .64 1.00 
24 .37 1.00 .73 1.12 • 31 .96 .53 1.08 
25 -.17 .79 -.38 .62 -.69 .80 -.76 .89 
26 .o4 1.24 .16 1.39 .31 1o1J .28 1.22 
27 .18 .99 -.02 .94 .12 1.04 .05 1.00 
28 .47 .90 .38 1.1J -.09 1.14 -.25 1.12 
29 .47 1.08 .46 1.14 .73 .97 .72 .85 
it JO -1.10 .95 -1.17 .91 -.78 1.28 -.71 1.08 
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Table 4 
Magnitude Scale Values and Standard Deviations 
= -
- --
-
Americans Indians 
Test Retest Test Retest 
Stimulus M d'a1 Ma2 (J Mb1 (J bi Mb2 u al a2 b2 
1 161.0 1955.5 1-81.0 2696.9 123 .1 306.3 105 .1 280 ,lj. 
2 99.0 1413.8 100. 8 766.4 106.3 1413.7 113.8 275.7 
J 52.6 223.4 57.9 1412.0 61. 9 232.9 77.0 242.4 
4 4.7 11.3 4.7 9.6 8.0 14.7 l :1 .4 74.0 
5 4.o 11.9 5.0 12.3 23.3 35.7 32 .1 155. 5 6 3.1 9.4 3.5 15.7 12.8 88.8 2J.8 113. 5 
7 102 .1 1867.8 100.8 721-J.. 9 56. j 24·2. 8 79.6 254.5 
8 4.5 11.1 4.8 11.0 9.3 45.3 j J. 4 74.2 
9 6.4 141.4 8,2 11+1. 2 24.2 83.5 37.0 198.8 
10 5.8 11.3 6.2 11,l 8.4 27.0 14.o 138.6 
11 24.2 140.6 23.0 38.0 17.2 72.7 27.1 113.Ll. 
12 8.8 70.9 9.0 73.9 14.8 57,7 16.2 89.8 
13 3.4 9.3 4 .1 8.7 12.6 33.5 13.8 82.3 14 70.3 1268.8 69.8 1275.3 98 .1 321.4 91 • 9 240.2 
15 1.9 14.9 2.9 11.9 8.4 24.9 12.2 73.8 
16 6.7 29.8 9.7 140.9 8.6 24.8 12.8 128.9 
17 31.5 76.0 28 .1 4.5 .2 28.5 80.8 34.6 128.4 
18 124.o 1960.4 120.4 1958.7 54.8 176.7 78.8 257.3 
19 13.0 32.7 12.8 :l 9. 5 1o.5 44.7 17.2 34.9 
20 45.9 710.6 42.1 199.9 71. j 241.J-. 3 76.0 228.5 
21 47.6 710.2 45.4 199.1 85.3 1413.4 78.6 177.8 
22 1.6 6.3 2.4 11.1 5.3 57.1 9.0 57.6 
23 17.4 72.5 20.2 140 .1 43.4 229.2 53.5 214.7 24. 4-2. 5 702.6 41+.4 704·.1 41-J..6 147.4 51. 9 135.5 
25 9.7 14.5 11.1 16. 6 16.3 64.o 22.5 92.4 
26 21. 3 88.1 29.9 1411.1 53.8 209.8 52. 1 210.3 
27 17.4 25.6 16.6 24.2 38.1 164.8 38.8 21 5 .4 
28 33.0 34.1 29.3 73.4 28.2 219.2 31. 0 195. 2 
29 35.8 1.LJ.O. 6 32.8 712.0 54.3 :l 80. 5 65.1 2:12.0 JO 3.3 10.8 3.6 6.6 9.3 41.9 14.6 109.4 
Table 5 
Correlations between Category Means and 
Category Scale Values 
-- Americans Indians 
M s. s. M s. s. 
x2 l.1 12 Y2 Ji J2 
M • 991 .995 .995 M .990 .993 .9 9 X• Y1 
.L 
Mx2 .982 .997 M .982 .992 Y2 
s. .989 s. .989 i1 Ji 
Inspection of this table indicates that the category means cor-
relate as highly with the category scale values as they do with the 
category means and vice versa, and that these correlations are all 
in the high .9o•s. This indicates that the "raw" category means 
were in all likelihood obtained from a normal distribution of judg·· 
ments (Rimoldi and Devane, 1960). Furthermore, this indicates that 
the partition and category scale values may be used interchange-
ably; and, at this level, nothing has been gained by scaling the 
datao 
A second basic consideration is the relation between the cate-
gory and magnitude scales. That is, has the typical logarithmic 
relation been found for this set of data? While no plots or good-
ness of fit tests were performed, the correlations presented in 
Table 6 indicate that the log function gives a better linear fit 
than does a linear equation. This holds for all comparisons. 
Also, the correlations between the category means and the magnitude 
scale values do not appear to be higher than the correlations be-
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tween the category scale values and the magnitude scale values, 
Table 6 
Correlations between Magnitude and Category Values 
Americans Indians 
Test Retest Test Retest 
M vs. M .893 .891 Mb vs• JV!y ,954 .933 a x 
Log Ma vs. M .989 .925 Log Mb vs. M .980 .980 x y 
!Vi vs. s. .893 .895 Mb vs. s. .937 .930 a 1 J 
Log Ma vs. s. 1 .980 .926 Log Mb vs. s. J ,974 .974 
E:rnerirnental results. Table 7 presents a direct test of the invar-
iance of the various scales. As ~entioned earlier in the text, the 
conditions for invariance are that the test-retest correlation be 
"high," the slope be equal to one, and the intercept be equal to 
zero (i.e., X1=X2 ). 
As can be seem by inspecting Table 7, the test-retest correla-
tions were high for all scale types for both Americans and Indians. 
However, the magnitude scale test-retest correlation for the Indi-
ans, while high, was lower than any of the other test-retest corre-
lations. The second criterion, that the slope be equal to one, was 
tested statistically for each of the comparisons (Draper and Smith, 
1966). For the Americans, only the magnitude scale had a slope 
which was not significantly different from one. (Notes the t value 
given under each slope indicates whether a given slope is signifi-
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cantly different from one.) Thus, both the category means (t=J.06) 
and the category scale values (t=J.8) did not fulfill this condi-
tion for invariance. Both the category (t=O) and the magnitude 
(t=-.J6) scale values had intercepts which were not significantly 
different from zero. In the case of the category scale values, the 
test-retest intercept of zero is a result of the definition of the 
scale For the case of the Indian sample, all three 
scale types had a slope which was not significantly different from 
one (category mean scales t=.58; category scale values t=l.55; mag-
nitude scale value: t=l.61). On the other hand, the category means 
(t=1.J9) and the category scale values (t=O) had intercepts which 
were not significantly different from zero; while the intercept for 
the magnitude scale (t=8.33) is significantly different from zero. 
Table 7 
Relation between Test-Retest Scale Values 
Americans Indians 
Cat. Cat. Mag. Cat. Cat. Mag. 
Means Scale Scale Means Scale Scale 
rxy .991 .989 .995 .990 .989 .969 
b 1.08* 1.10* 1.04 1. 02 1.04 .93 Y•X 
(slope) t= 3. 06 t= J. 81 t=1. 99 t= .58 t=1. 55 t= 1.61 
c -.547** o.oo -.36 -.22 o.oo 8.33** y•x 
(inter- t=3.49 t=O. 00 t=-. 35 t=1. 39 t:O, 00 t= 3. 76 
cept) 
*Slope significantly different fran 1.00 
**Intercept significantly different from o.oo 
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Figure 1 
Americans - Test-Retest Category Means 
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Figure 2 
Americans - Test-Retest Category Scale Values 
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Americans - Test-Retest Magnitude Scale Values 
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Indians - Test-Retest Category Means 
11 
10 
9 
8 
• 
7 
5 
4 '1i 
I 
! 
3 
2 
1 
1 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 
33 
-2.00 
Figure 5 
Indians - Test-Retest Category Scale Values 
-1.00 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
• 
• • 
-1.0 
-2.0 
34 
Figure 6 
Indians - Test-Retest Magnitude Scale Values 
• 
110 
• 
' 100 
• 90 
80 •• 
• 
M 70 
b2 
60 
50 
40 
JO • 
• 
20 
:11 
111 i1 
10 I~ 
10 20 JO 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 
Mb 
1 
35 
The relation of the test-retest data for all scale types, Am-
·c~n and Indian, is presented in Figures 1 to 6. A unit slope 
er1 ~ · 
and zero intercept line has been fitted to each of these graphs. 
Inspection of these figures indicates that the fit is reasonably 
good for all but the magnitude scale of the Indian sample. Obvi-
ously, however, the fit is best for the American magnitude scale 
values, the Indian category means, and the Indian category scale 
Since it is not possible to test directly whether the test-
retest correlation was higher for a particular scale type, the com-
parative reliabilities of the category and magnitude methods will 
be explored indirectly. This will be done in two ways. First of 
all, correlations were computed between test-retest estimates for 
both category and magnitude judgments for each subject. Table 8 
presents the frequency distributions of these test-retest correla-
tions. A sign test was performed comparing the reliability of cat-
egory versus magnitude estimates for both Indians and Americans. 
These results are presented at the bottom of Table 8. 
Inspection of this table indicates that the modal test-retest 
correlation for all groups is somewhere in the high .?O's or .so•s. 
Notice, however, that the Indian magnitude correlations tend to be 
more spread out than for the other scales, and several of these 
correlations are of zero order. Twenty of the American subjects 
made more reliable category estimates, while 26 made more reliable 
magnitude estimates. A sign test (normal curve approximation) (z= 
-.?4) indicates that neither judgment method was consistently more 
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l iable than the other. Similarly, 27 of the Indians made more re -
reliabie magnitude estimates, and 21 made more reliable magnitude 
estimates. Again, there was no significant trend for either of the 
methods to be more reliable. 
Table 8 
Frequency Distribution of Correlations between 
Test-Retest Judgments by Subjects 
Americans Indians 
r X1X2 r aia2 r Y1Y2 
r bib2 
- .10 
-
.09 0 0 1 4 
.10 
- .19 1 1 0 3 
.20 
- .29 0 0 0 3 
.JO - .39 0 0 2 2 
.40 
- .49 0 0 1 2 
.50 - .59 0 0 2 2 
.60 - .69 2 5 7 4 
.70 - .79 9 7 16 9 
.so 
- .89 24 22 15 16 
.90 - .99 14 15 6 5 
Erx x > r = 20 L:r > r = 27 
1 2 a1a2 Y1Y2 b1b2 
Er < r = 26 L:r < r = 21 
x1x2 a1a2 Y1Y2 b1b2 
Ties = 4 Ties = 2 
Sign tests Z=- • 74 Sign tests Z= .72 
The relative reliability of the two methods was also explored 
from the point of view of the reliability of each stimulus. That 
is, for a given stimulus, what is the correlation between first and 
second estimates? Table 9 presents the frequency distributions for 
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the reliability of each stimulus for category and magnitude esti-
rr.a. te s • 
Table 9 
Frequency Distribution of Correlations between 
Test-Retest Judgments by Stimulus 
Americans Indians 
r 
xlx2 
r 
ala2 
r 
Y1Y2 
r b1b2 
.oo .09 0 0 1 13 
.10 - .19 0 2 0 3 
.20 - .29 1 2 1 0 
.30 - .39 5 2 3 2 
.40 - .49 2 1 6 2 
.50 - .59 8 3 6 3 
.60 - .69 4 6 10 4 
.70 - .79 7 7 3 3 
.80 - .89 3 1 0 0 
.90 - .99 0 6 0 0 
From this table, it is clear that the magnitude stimuli of the 
Indian sample appear to be less reliable than any of the other 
scales. Table 10 presents a sign test comparing the reliability of 
the stimuli for the category and magnitude methods for the Indian 
and American samples. 
From this table it can be seen that in the case of the Ameri-
can sample, stimuli were not more reliable under either of the 
judgment methods (z=-0.18); while in the Indian sample the category 
method was significantly more reliable than the magnitude method 
38 
Table 10 
Sign Test Contrasting Reliability of Magnitude 
versus Category Values 
Americans Indians 
~r > r =14 
x1x2 a1a2 Lr > r = 23 Y1Y2 b1b2 
Lr < r =16 
xlx2 a1a2 Lr < r = 7 Y1Y2 b1b2 
z=-0.18 Z=2.74* 
*p<. 05 
A comparison of the reliability of the stimuli was also made 
between Indians and Americans for both category and magnitude esti-
mates. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Sign Test Contrasting Reliability of Scale 
Value Estimates by Indians and Americans 
L: Indians > Americans 
L: Indians < Americans 
*p<.05 
Category 
13 
17 
z=-.55 
Magnitude 
7 
23 
z=-2.74* 
For category scales, neither the Americans nor the Indians made con-
sistently more reliable estimates of the stimuli (z=-.55); however, 
for the magnitude scales, the Americans made more reliable estimates 
than the Indians (z=-2.74). In summary, then, it appears that the 
Indians were not able to make the magnitude estimates as well as 
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the category judgments, nor as well as the Americans making magni-
tude or category judgments. 
In order to explore which stimuli are unreliable, the stimulus 
variabilities of the category judgments were plotted against the 
category means, and the stimulus reliabilities of the magnitude es-
timates were plotted against the magnitude scale values. The lin-
ear correlations of these plots are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Correlation between Scale Values and 
Reliability of the Scale Values 
Mx vs. r M vs. r 
1 x1x2 a1 a1a2 
American .069 .151 
Indian 
-.115 .440* 
*p<. 05 
The only correlation which is significant is that of the Indi-
an magnitude scale values versus their reliabilities. This signi-
ficant correlation indicates that there is a tendency for the lower 
stimuli to be less reliable. 
It is of interest to investigate whether the scales are invar-
iant cross-culturally. Only one aspect of this invariance will be 
investigated, namely, the correlation between these two samples. 
Table 13 presents these results. 
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Table 13 
Correlations between Indian and American Scale Values 
= Category Category Magnitude 
Means Scale Values Scale Values 
-- Ind. Amer. Amer. Ind. Amer, Amer. Ind. Amer. Amer. 
Retest Test Retest Retest Test Retest Retest Test Re test 
Inct. 
.990 .905 .891 .989 .864 ,888 .969 .835 .839 Test 
Ind. 
Retest .885 ,885 ,845 .880 .863 .854 
Amer. 
• 991 .989 .995 Test 
First of all, it is clear that the cross-cultural correlations 
are markedly lower than the within-cultural correlations. This 
holds for all three sets of scales. On the other hand, it appears 
that the category means cross-cultural correlations are higher than 
those of the category scale values and magnitude scale values. 
The above analyses have been concerned with the invariance of 
the scale values. In this section, the invariance of the standard 
deviations of the stimuli will be examined. If a scaling procedure 
is to be considered invariant, it is not enough that the central 
tendencies of the stimuli remain constant; it is also important 
that the uncertainty or dispersion of the stimuli remain constant. 
Table 14 presents the correlations, slopes, and intercepts for the 
test-retest standard deviations. Inspection of this table indicates 
that the test-retest correlation is highest for the standard devia-
tions of the category means, with the category scale discriminal 
dispersions and magnitude scale standard deviations being consider-
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ablY lower. This holds true for both the Americans and Indians. 
Table 14 
Relation between Test-Retest Standard Deviations 
Americans Indians 
O'x () . l. O'a O'y () . J ab 
rxy .921 .729 .753 .759 .431 .465 
by•X 1.258 1.113 .805 .696* .386* .099* 
(slope) t= 1.15 t=O, 57 t=1.47 t=-2 .67 t=J. 86 t=2. 52 
cy.x 
-.649 -.113 113.065 .669** .614** 139.36** 
(intercept) t== 1. 35 t=- .56 t= 1. 23 t=-2 ,49 t= J. 80 t=9 .89 
* Slope significantly different from 1.00 
**Intercept significantly different from o.oo 
Also, only the correlation for the standard deviations of category 
means for the Americans is reasonably high. Furthermore, the Amer-
icans have higher correlations than the Indians for all scale 
types, As far as the slopes are concerned, all American scales 
have slopes which are not significantly different from one, while 
the Indians have slopes which are significantly different from one 
on all scales. Similarly, all American scale intercepts are not 
significantly different from zero, while for the Indian scales they 
are. Figures 7 to 12 present these results graphically. A unit 
slope and zero intercept are fitted to all these graphs. Inspec-
tion of the graphs indicates that only the magnitude scales, both 
Indian and American, do not cluster closely to the line defining 
invariance. In the case of the magnitude scales, the test-retest 
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standard deviations are most deviant when they are large. 
Finally, the relation between the scale value for a stimulus 
and its standard deviation was explored. That is, the category 
means were related to their standard deviations, the category scale 
values to their discriminal dispersions, and the magnitude scale 
values to their standard deviations. This was done for test and 
retest conditions for the American and Indian samples. These re-
sults are presented in Table 15. 
Mx vs. O'x 
s. 
1 
vs. ()'. 
1 
M 
·a vs. O'a 
Table 15 
Correlations between Scale Values and 
Their Standard Deviations 
Americans Indians 
Test Retest Test Retest 
.297 .244 M vs. ay .055 .264 y 
• 109 .201 s . vs. a . -.385* -.237 
J J 
.950* .873* Mb vs. ab .680* .sso* 
With the exception of the Indian test data, the correlations be-
tween category scale values and their dispersions is of zero order. 
On the other hand, the magnitude scale values all correlate posi-
tively with their standard deviations. This result has been ob-
tained by others and is known as Ekman's law. These results are 
presented graphically, for the test data only, in Figures 13 to 18. 
Inspection of these graphs indicates that the category means, while 
not linearly related to their standard deviations, are slightly 
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curvilinearly related. That is, there is a tendency for the middle 
stimuli to have larger standard deviations than extreme stimuli. 
However, the American category scale values are unrelated to their 
discriminal dispersions. In fact, they are relatively constant. 
on the other hand, the Indian category scales are linearly related 
to their discriminal dispersions, and the relation is slightly neg-
ative. But this result appears to be based on about seven of the 
stimuli. If they were eliminated, the correlation would probably 
be of zero order. Finally, for the magnitude data, the standard 
deviations are, in most cases, larger than the scale values. 
Discussion 
" I 
I 
! 
As noted in the introduction, a distinction has been made be- 1 
tween category scale values and the category means. Stevens has 
argued that category means and category scale values are not re-
lated to the magnitude scale values by the same function. That is, 
the category scale values tend to be a logarithmic function of the 
magnitude scale; while the relation between category means and mag-
nitude scale values, though concave downward, is less concave than 
a log function. From another point of view, Jones has shown that 
partition scales are not invariant, while category scales are; and 
that extreme stimuli will not be differentiated on a partition 
scale. The results obtained in this paper cast some doubt on these 
contentions. 
First of all, since the category scale values correlate as 
highly with the category means as with the other category scale 
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values, and since all these correlations are in the high ,9o•s, it 
seems that there is a near perfect linear fit between these two 
types of scales. If this is the case, then it would seem that the 
relation between all category scales (both partition and confusion 
scales) and magnitude scales should be of the same general form. 
furthennore, the category means and category scale values for each 
set of judgments correlate the same (with one exception) with the 
magnitude scales. This holds true when relating the category val-
ues both to the magnitude scale and to the log of the magnitude 
scale. Thus, for three of the four sets of data, there is no indi-
cation of differences in degree of concaveness for the category 
means and scale values. For the one exception, the Indian test 
data, there is evidence that the category scale values are more 
concavely related to the magnitude values than are the category 
means. That is, the correlation between the magnitude scale and 
category means is higher than the correlation between the magnitude 
scale and the category scale values. On the other hand, the log of 
the magnitude scale correlates more highly with the category scale 
values than with the category means. These results indicate that 
with the category means, there is less of a log relation than with 
the category scale values. In summary, it can be concluded that 
probably there is little difference in the way that category means 
and category scale values relate to the magnitude scale. Further-
more, in all cases, the category values correlate more highly with 
the log of the magnitude scale than with the simple magnitude scale 
Values, thus indicating that the typical log relation has been 
found. 
•--
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The next consideration is whether there is, as Jones has stat-
ed, a lack of discrimination in the extreme stimuli of the category 
means. ~he logical basis for assuming that stimuli at either end 
of the scale will be lumped together is the constraints placed on 
judgments in a category rating scale. That is, the subjects, in 
the case of the present scale, can give nu~erical estimates only 
from one to eleven for the stimuli. It seems reasonable to assume 
that, given a broad range of stimuli, there are probably more than 
eleven degrees of seriousness. And thus, at some point, stimuli 
which are really different will not be separated. One way to over-
come this apparent difficulty would be to make the scales open-
ended in the same way that the magnitude scales are. Thus, a sub-
ject would be asked to give any number, either positive or nega-
tive, indicating the degree of affective value for that stimulus. 
So~e simple type of average (not the mean) could be used to esti-
mate the scale value of the stimulus. In this case, the scaling 
procedure would be exactly the same as that for magnitude scales, 
only the type of judgment would be different. However, this type of 
procedure would not allow for scaling the data using the Law of Cat-
egorical Judgments--at least in terms of the methods currently a-
vailable. Also, results in this study cast doubt on whether an 
open-ended procedure is preferable to a scale where the judgments 
are highly anchored. These results will be reported later in the 
discussion. 
Returning to Jones' argument, are the extreme stimuli "con-
fused" when using category means? Referring to Table 5, which pre-
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sents the high intercorrelations between the category means and 
category scale values, it does not seem too likely that if this ef-
t'tt feet is present that it is as marked as Jones indicates. In order 
:~,If> to more fully explore this issue, the first testing of the catego-
~t rY scale values was plotted against the first testing of the cate-
gory means for both the Americans and Indians (Figures 19 and 20). 
Inspection of these graphs indicates that this effect is present to 
a limited degree. That is, at the extremes the category means tend 
to be less spread out than the category scale values; however, these 
',I' 
r. 
stimuli do have different values. Thus, it is probably too strong 
a statement to say that extreme stimuli cannot be discriminated on 
a category means scale. 
Jones, as has been stated earlier, has presented evidence that 
the category scale values are invariant, while the category means 
are not. It should be remembered that Jones used a nine-point 
scale in his test condition and a six-point scale in his retest 
condition. Thus, the two scales are not comparable, and one would 
not expect to find an invariant relation between these two scales. 
It is, of course, interesting that the category scale values did 
remain invariant across the two different types of scales. In the 
present study, the rating scale has eleven categories in both the 
test and retest conditions. The question, then, is whether the 
category means will demonstrate the same type of invariance as the 
category scale values, given that the rating scales are of the same 
size in the test and retest conditions. As indicated in Table 7, 
the test-retest correlations for the category means and category 
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scale values are almost identical for both the Americans and Indi-
ans, and all of these correlations are around ,99, Statistically, 
the category means and category scale values are not invariant for 
the American sample, while they are invariant for the Indian sam-
ple• Notice, however, that graphically, a unit slope and zero in-
tercept appear to fit the data quite well for all comparisons. 
Thus, given rating scales of the same number of categories, there 
seems to be little difference between the invariance of the catego-
ry scale values and the category means. 
On the other hand, in terms of the invariance of the standard 
aeviations of the category means and scale values, the two methods 
tehave somewhat differently. As was indicated in Table 4, the test-
retest correlations for the standard deviations of the category 
means are markedly higher than the test-retest correlations of the 
discriminal dispersions for both the American and Indian samples. 
Thus, the uncertainty of a stimulus remains relatively more con-
stant with the simple category judgments than with the theoretical-
ly more sophisticated scaling model. 
As far as the test-retest slopes and intercepts are concerned, 
the two methods demonstrate similar results. That is, for the Am-
erican sample, there is an approximately invariant relation between 
test and retest measures of dispersion for both the category means 
and category scale values; while for the Indian sample, neither of 
the two demonstrates invariance. 
As is indicated in Table 13, there is a slight tendency for 
the category means to correlate more highly across cultures than 
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the category scale values. This indicates that the results ob-
tained from different samples of subjects, as far as the ordering 
of the stimuli is concerned, vary less in the simple category 
means than in the scale values. 
Finally, as can be seen in Figures 15 and 16, the discriminal 
dispersions for the American sample remain relatively constant for 
all scale values; while for the Indian sample, there is a slight 
tendency for the discriminal dispersions to get smaller as the af-
fective value of the stimuli increases. On the other hand, as can 
be seen in Figures 13 and 14, there is a slight tendency for the 
standard deviations to be smaller at both ends of the continuum. 
These results suggest that the dispersions of the category means 
are somewhat affected by the anchoring of the scale. That is, 
since subjects cannot make judgments greater than eleven or less 
than one, extreme stimuli may have smaller dispersions. However, 
scaling these judgments removes this end effect. 
In summary, while several differences have been found between 
the scaled and unscaled judgments, the two procedures give quite 
similar results. That is, there are practically no differences be-
tween the scale values of the two methods. The unscaled judgments 
seem to be somewhat affected in the extremes, but this is only a 
tendency and does not seem to markedly affect the scale. On the 
other hand, the standard deviations of the category means are more 
reliable than the discriminal dispersions. However, the results 
are similar enough that it would seem that these two scale types 
can be used interchangeably. Thus, results reported later in this 
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"'ver will be comparing "category judgments" and "magnitude judg-
P""· 
t . " rnen s • That is, the Thurstone scaling model will be considered as 
~ refinement of a more general category method. This implies a 
slight shift in the emphasis of this paper. Originally, the pur-
pose was to compare Thurstone's versus Stevens' model. This origi-
nal purpose has been broadened now to ask the question whether sub-
jects can make interval and ratio judgments with equal facility. 
Statistical results indicate that the scale values of each of 
these two types of judgmental procedures are not consistently in-
variant. As far as the test-retest correlations are concerned, all 
the correlations are high; though for the magnitude estimates of 
the Indian sample, the correlation was relatively lower than the 
others. However, it is safe to say that this preliminary aspect of 
invariance has been satisfied for all samples and estimation proce-
dures. The primary test of invariance (unit slope and zero inter-
cept) indicates that the Americans' magnitude judgments were invar-
iant, while their category judgments were not. Just the opposite 
is true for the Indians. These results imply that some subject 
groups can better make category judgments, while other populations II 
can better make magnitude judgments. A 2riori, it is impossible to 
know whether a given sample is better at making category or magni-
tude judgments. 
These conclusions are based on statistical analysis, which, of 
course, provides the most objective analysis. However, visual in-
spection of the test-retest plots indicates that a unit slope and 
zero intercept fit the data quite well, with the one exception of 
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t~e Indian magnitude data. It should also be noted that for the 
Arnerican category judgments, while the data points are all reason-
a.blY close to the line, they are not symmetrically distributed on 
either side of the line at a given point on the continuum. Thus, 
though a reasonably good fit has been obtained, in a strict sense 
they are not invariant. 
Since the scales are not uniformly invariant, the next ques-
tion to ask is what causes this lack of invariance. In order to 
answer this question partially, two sources of error were identi-
fied1 lack of reliability by subject and lack of reliability by 
stimulus. 
If failure to achieve invariance is the result of individual 
subjects not being able to reliably estimate scale values, then the 
following results should be obtained1 1) For the American sample, 
individual subjects should be consistently able to make more reli-
able magnitude estimates than category estimates. 2) For the Indi-
an sample, individual subjects should be consistently able to make 
more reliable category judgments than magnitude judgments. Analy-
sis of the data indicates that the Americans were not better able 
to estimate the magnitude values (z.,74), and the Indians were not 
better able to make category judgments (z•.72). Thus, it cannot be 
concluded that the lack of invariance for either the magnitude or 
category scales is related to the individual subjects' lack of re-
liability in their judgmental procedures. 
If the lack of invariance of the scales is due to the unreli-
ability of particular stimuli, then for the Americans, the stimuli 
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estimated by the magnitude method ought to be more reliable than 
those estimated by the category method. Similarly, for the Indian 
sample, the stimuli estimated by the category method ought to be 
more reliable than those estimated by the magnitude method. The 
results indicate that for the American sample, the stimuli were no 
more reliable with magnitude judgments than with category judgments 
(z=,18). Since the category scales for the Indians were invariant, 
one also might expect that, for category judgments, the stimuli of 
the Indian sample might be more reliable than those of the American 
sample. However, the results indicate that there were no differ-
ences between the two samples (z=.55). Thus it does not seem that 
the lack of invariance of the category judgments is due to the un-
reliability either of individuals or of stimuli. Perhaps, then, 
the reason for the lack of invariance, if related to either of these 
variables, may be found by investigating the slopes and intercepts 
of the stimuli. 
Finally, for the Indian sample, the results indicate that the 
category judgments are more reliable than the rnagni tude judgments. 
Furthermore, the magnitude judgments of the Americans are more re-
liable than those of the Indians. Thus, at least to some degree, 
the lack of invariance of the Indian magnitude estimates may be at-
tributed to the unreliability of the stimuli. As noted above for 
the category judgments, there may be other reasons which explain 
the lack of invariance. 
Since it has been established that the Indian magnitude scale 
is adversely affected by the unreliability of some of the stimuli, 
the next question to ask is whether the unreliable stimuli are in 
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way a function of their placement along the affective continu-
This apparently is the case. That is, there is a tendency 
for the lower stimuli to be less reliable (r=.40). It seems that 
when some subjects are asked to make judgments about stimuli which 
have less affective value than the standard, they are unable to do 
this very well. It should be noted that this may not represent 
50me quirk of the human judgmental a bi li ty, but rather it may be 
related to the arithmetic procedures involved. That is, without 
paper and pencil, subjects may have some problem calculating, for 
example, 1/36 of :t 0; whereas they can easily multi ply any whole 
number by 10. This problem, if it is the reason for the lack of 
reliability, can be easily corrected. For example, one might 
choose a stimulus of very low affective value as the standard, or 
use some other magnitude estimation procedure, such as the constant 
sum method. 
~he cross-cultural correlations between scale values tend to 
be higher for the category judgments (both category means and scale 
values) than for the magnitude judgments. While the differences in 
the size of the correlations of the magnitude and category scales 
is not very large, there is a consistency in these results which 
suggests that the category scales are more stable than are the mag-
nitude scales. The implication of these results is that a category 
scale derived from one population may be more representative of an-
other population than a magnitude scale would be. 
As was pointed out earlier, the concept of in~ariance of a 
scale has to be considered not only for the scale values themselves, 
but also for their dispersions. The scale values are some sort of 
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r:i.verat~e of the judgments. If these values are to be used for pre-
dicting behavior, then we must also have a measure of agreement of 
the sample with this central value. Obviously, the measure of dis-
persion should also be invariant. The results indicated that the 
test-retest correlations of the standard deviations for category 
means are higher than those of the magnitude scale values and the 
category scale values. Also, the American sample uniformly has 
higher correlations. In fact, for the Indian sample, there is lit-
tle relation between the standard deviations of the first and sec-
ond testing for both the category and magnitude sea~ values. 
These low correlations indicated that if we were using the scale 
values to predict the choic~ behavior between two stimuli which had 
fairly similar affective values, the lack of stability in the way 
the group distributes about the central value for each stimulus 
would make prediction all but impossible. In terms of the slope 
and intercept relating test-retest standard deviations, invariant 
results were obtained for all three scale types for the Americans 
but not for the Indians. Since neither method demonstrated con-
sistently invariant stimulus dispersions, caution should be used in 
attempting to predict group choice or judgment whether using either 
a category or magnitude procedure. 
Finally, one more issue will be discussed which, though not 
directly related to invariance, points to certain differences be-
tween magnitude and category judgments. The issue is concerned with 
the relation between the affective value of a stimulus and its stan-
dard deviation. For the category means, there is a tendency for the 
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standard deviations to be smallest at the extremes. As discussed 
earlier, this is probably a result of the definition of the scale. 
AlSO, as noted before, the discriminal dispersions of the category 
scale values tend to be unrelated to the magnitude of the stimulus, 
though in the case of the Indian sample there is a slight negative 
relation, The standard deviations of the magnitude values are pro-
portional to the affective value of the stimuli. That is, as the 
affective value of the stimulus increases, the standard deviation 
increases. This probably occurs because of the open-endedness of 
the scales. 
These results are of interest from two points of view. First 
of all, Stevens has argued that the standard deviations of stimuli 
are not constant but increase with the magnitude of the stimulus 
(Ekman' s Law). This result has been found here for magnitude 
scales, as before. However, it is clearly not true for either cat-
egory means or category scale values. The discriminal dispersions 
are relatively constant across the continuum. Thus, the use of Ek-
man's Law as an argument against using the Case V solution, or as 
an explanation for the concave downward relation between magnitude 
and category scales, is not valid. 
From a different point of view, the increasing standard devia-
tions of the magnitude scale points to the problem of using an 
open-ended scale. For most of the stimuli of high affective value, 
the standard deviation is larger than the mean, which to a certain 
extent makes the mean meaningless. That is, the scale value of a 
given stimulus does not represent, very closely, the affective val-
rd 
ue for a large number of the sample. Furthermore, the prediction 
of choj_ce behavior becomes impossible when the standard deviations 
are so large. Thus, as has been pointed out earlier in another 
context, it would seem preferable to use magnitude scales which 
place constraints on the size of the estimates. 
In summary, then, neither method has been found to be consist-
ently invariant. In fact, the results suggest that magnitude esti-
mates may be appropriate to one population, while category esti-
mates may be appropriate to another. The lack of invariance of the 
standard deviations of both category and magnitude measures suggests 
caution in using scale values to predict choice behavior. And fi-
nally, it was suggested that the open-ended procedure typically 
used in magnitude scales be avoided. 
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Appendix 
List of Stimuli 
1. The offender stabs a person to death. 
2. The offender forces a female to submit to sexual intercourse. 
J. The offender performs an illegal abortion. 
4. The offender breaks into a department store and steals mer-
chandise worth $5.00. 
5. The offender is found firing a rifle for which he has no per-
mit. 
6. The offender is intoxicated in public. 
7. The offender kills a person by reckless driving of an auto-
mobile. 
8. The offender breaks into a school and steals $5.00 worth of 
supplies. 
9. An unmarried couple willingly have sexual intercourse. 
100 The offender breaks into a residence, forces open a cash box, 
and steals $s.oo. 
11. The offender administers heroin to himself. 
12. The offender makes an obscene phone call. 
1Jo The offender disturbs the neighborhood with loud noisy beha-
vior. 
14. The offender has sexual intercourse with his step-daughter. 
15. Juvenile plays hookey from school. 
16. The offender tortures a cat. 
170 The offender steals a famous art work from a museum. 
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18. The offender, having been greatly cheated by the store owner, 
kills him. 
19. The offender refuses to pay the rent for his apartment. 
20. The husband commits adultery. 
21. The wife commits adultery. 
22. A starving man steals food for his family. 
23. The offender exposes his genitals in public. 
24. The offender commits bigamy. 
25. The offender steals tires from an automobile. 
26. The offender makes an attempt at suicide, 
27. The offender steals a religious object from a house of wor-
ship. 
28. The offender assaults his teacher in class. 
29. The offender practices prostitution. 
30. The offender destroys a library book. 
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